Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

1) The fundamental flaw in this statement (as in the whole Bill of Rights) is the assumption that a democratic government, which has power over even those who do not want it, is a necessary prerequisite of a statement of rights. To the extent that any human rights are valid (ie. true for reality) they are "unalienable" (as TDOI assures us) and outside the purview of any government to decide. To the extent that any human "rights" can or need to be declared, sanctioned and promoted by governments, they are privileges requiring one person to relinquish portions of his life, liberty and property to those who are privileged to receive them.

2) Secondary problems are:

a) the collectivist thinking of the politicians of the era when the Bill of Rights was written. What kind of entity exactly is "the people", "the press", etc.? Collectives don't have rights (mainly because they don't exist as thinking evaluating entities in reality); only individuals have rights. This is not mere nit-picking, but a fundamental distinction. For an individual, any right of "assembly" is not distinguishable from his right of liberty, and what is a right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances" other than an individual's right of free speech, again derived from his right of liberty. How can there be any "collective" rights which are different from individual rights? From what attributes of reality could these possibly arise?

b) that there is no explanation given or even implied concerning on whose property any of these rights apply. If they are to apply to everyone's property, then they are a clear violation of the right of ownership and control of property by the owner. Must I allow any person "freedom of speech" as he likes, to passersby while standing on my front lawn? Are "the people" to be free "peaceably to assemble" in my living room whenever they like? Clearly this omission set up the conflicts between liberty and ownership rights which has lead to the confusion of private with public which is so rampant in the court decisions of current society, and so abusive to the right of owners to fully control the use of their property.

Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

3) At the time when the Bill of Rights was written, "Militia" meant a trained and armed citizenry. However, the Framers of the Bill of Rights appear to have thought that the major purpose of such a Militia was the defense of the "state" as a collective entity rather than the defense of the individuals within it. This is because they appear to have believed that it was not possible for individuals to be free and orderly without a government to rule them and keep them in order. It is unfortunate that this amendment did not clarify and protect the right of self-defense of the individual citizen and make that right the reason for not infringing "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms". As before, this amendment was considerably weakened by using the term "the people" to describe what should have this right, rather than assigning this right "to keep and bear arms" to each individual. The only legitimate purpose of any armed forces, whether a do-it-yourself militia or a paid protection service organization, is the protection of the life, liberty and property of those (and that of their loved ones) who either provide such service for themselves or contract with others to do so. Protection is merely a service (in the category of order maintenance services) which individuals will find they need and will ensure is provided one way or the other if left to their own devices. Each person could perform this task for himself, but trade to mutual advantage and the long-term best interests of all are optimized by division and specialization of labor with respect to protection services (or any other order maintenance function) just as for any other service.

4) In a voluntary society it is not the "security of a free state", but the security of the rights of each individual who is part of that society and subscribes to its services, which is the purpose of any well organized and trained force of armed men and women whether called a "militia" or any other name. In fact, the only circumstances under which the "security of a free state" would need to be protected would be if the state apparatus and the bureaucrats themselves were under attack by the citizens because of violations of their rights. However, that is exactly the kind of protection which is invalid, since if the power of the state truly derives from its individual members, any such protection would imply the contradictory situation where something is being protected from itself!

Whether those subscribing to a protection agency would be allowed to still keep their own weapons would be entirely up to the stipulations of the contract between the protection organization and its clients. It might be unwise for any individual to agree to a contractual clause which forbade him to keep a weapon, but that simply means that there would be very few protection agencies in existence which would have such a stipulation in their client contracts because any protection agency which did so would attract few clients. However, it might reasonably be the case that the contract would forbid the carrying of weapons in certain circumstances, say, within the confines of a court used by a protection agency. It is entirely up to the contract between the protection service organization and its client under what circumstances weapons may be carried. However, if a person has no contract with anyone to the contrary, it is entirely up to him whether he keeps and bears weapons or not on his own property.

Amendment III

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

5) Members of protection service organizations (police or soldiers) should have no different rights and privileges than do any other individuals in society ("all men are created equal" - in rights). Furthermore, if government has no special power over protection service persons beyond that of any other of the organization's clients, then there can be no clear distinction between "peace" and "war" because the extent of conflict at any time and place is only a matter of degree and not of kind. Finally, the existence of a law allowing the violation of someone's property does not make such an act any less an immoral and culpable violation of that person's inalienable rights, and the right of the victim of the violation to restitution is still the same.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

6) The rights named in this amendment should be inviolable unconditionally! The words "unreasonable" and "probable cause" are completely inconsistent with the inalienable and personal character of the rights to life, liberty and property. Any interpretation of those words by others will make exception to those rights, if the action which is taken is not precisely what the individual whose life, liberty and property are under attack would have himself taken or allowed. Furthermore, there is no right or method of redress or restitution to the individual whose rights are violated specified within this amendment, but only a weak attempt to make such violations "difficult" by requiring that they be "reasonable", have "probable cause" and need "oaths, affirmations and descriptions" before they may be legally done.

In any acceptable social order violations of the rights to life, liberty and property of an individual must be restitutable by the violator(s) and the correct way to formulate such methods of redress is to acknowledge the principle that in every human interaction in which the threat or use of force, or of fraud occurs, one party is the victim and the other is the violator. Thus, search and seizure of any individual's person and property will be a non-culpable action, if and only if that individual is afterwards proven to have been a previous violator of those who are doing the searching and seizing, or of the client(s) of such searchers and seizers who are acting as agents of those person(s) who were previously violated. (In this sense it may be said that a violator has, by his actions in stepping outside the realm of "acceptable" human behavior - ie. the behavior determined by human nature in reality to be optimal for enhancing one's lifetime happiness in a social context, temporarily lost some of his rights with respect to the person who he has violated.) In turn, if a person is searched or seized and is then proven to not have been a previous violator of those who instituted the search or seizure, then they (the searchers and/or seizers) become the violators and he becomes the victim. For this reason, the idea of swearing out a statement about exactly what and who is to be searched and seized before performing such an act is probably a very practical thing to do, even though it does not make one any less culpable by doing so. In addition, the contractual terms of most protection agencies would likely allow them to sue the client (who made a false statement which led to their violational search and/or seizure) for the responsibility damages which they would have to pay to the victim in order to restitute him. Of course, protection agencies and even individuals might also carry insurance protection for such mistakes. However, the nature of this practical arrangement has little bearing on the ethics of the situation.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;

7) This is another clause which has little connection with ethics but is mainly an attempt to legislate a particular judicial method. However, even the very concept of a "capital crime" is untenable since it reverses the roles of violational effect and appropriate punishment by use of the word "capital" meaning "punishable by death". Moreover it also allows a loophole of non-culpability for violators, "since if a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" does not occur, that person can not be held to answer for his violation and the victim will receive no restitution - ie. justice will not be done. In addition, this statement also violates the principle that "all men are created equal" (with respect to their rights) by making exceptions for members of government sanctioned armed forces "in time of War or public danger", from whose violations, once again, victims will receive no restitution. Furthermore, as stated before, there is no clear way to distinguish among the various states of war, peace, public danger or any other situation where mass violence is threatened or occurring. Finally, whether the form of a "Grand Jury" is optimal for determination of the beginning of a trial is not something to be decided for all persons and for all time by some authoritative document. A court for the adjudication of trials concerning the validity of charges of violation is simply another kind of service which is most reasonably performed by specialists, and will be subscribed to by the protagonists in any dispute most reasonably as part of the contractual arrangement which began their interaction.

nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

8) This is another, rather arbitrary, attempt at a practical solution; in this case to the ostensible problem of harrassment due to multiple retrials of someone that others continue to think is their violator even after an acceptable court has cleared him. In a free society ordered completely by voluntary trading actions, such solutions to practical problems would be invented and instituted by the organizations providing the court services as they honed their methods to best suit their clients, instead of being decreed as the one and only way by a monopolistic authoritarian state acting as an overlord. However, in this case the solution required by the "Bill of Rights" is morally wrong and even repugnant to justice because it violates the inalienable and unending right of the victim to gain restitution from the violator. Furthermore, if the failure to prove the guilt of an accused party also resulted in his accusers being guilty of having violated him by apprehending him and forcing him to defend himself (as it would in any voluntary justice system), then the accusers would be far more concerned and cautious of being very certain of their case and of his guilt before proceeding to bring him to trial. On the other hand, if he went free (and even received restitution from them for false arrest and other harm to his liberty, time and assets because of having to defend himself) and then later he was convicted, say because new convincing evidence was found, he would in the end have to pay back all that he had received and also the appropriate restitution for the original violation. With such an arrangement of full restitution in place, there would be no need whatsoever to forbid multiple trials for the same offence. For it to be forbidden by law, as it is currently, is thus seen to be potentially a grave injustice to the true victim.

nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

9) Although I don't know if it has been argued this way, it appears to me that the comma occuring after "himself" (instead of a semicolon) and again after "property" clearly indicates that the right to not be compelled to testify against one's self is not absolute, but can be overridden by "due process of law". In any case, this whole clause is again a case of not understanding the proper basis on which these rights exist. If the person on trial is finally proven to be a violator then he actually lost some of his rights within his relationship to the victim(s) at the time of the initial violation. Therefore, the victim had every right to both compel him to testify and to deprive him of life, liberty and property, as neccessary in order to assure that the victim is fully restituted. On the other hand, if the accused is found to be not guilty of the charges, then the roles are reversed and plaintiff and his agents become the violator and the accused the victim! The major principle here is not so much one of absolute inviolable rights but one of complete responsibility for the culpable harm done by one's actions.

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

10) Since there is no existing collective in reality denoted by "public", but only individual human beings with equal rights, this clause is quite vacuous unless it means "taken for the use of other individuals". This, however, makes it patently clear that such expropriation is not different than any other theft from the one by the many. Moreover, even if one was able to define the "public" as some special existing entity, taking private property from an individual without his permission with or without compensation would violate his right to ownership and complete control over his property. Although "just compensation" would be a kind of restitution, unless the victim himself were allowed to specify the type and amount of such restitution up to and including the return of the original private property completely as it was, true justice would never be able to be achieved.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

11) This is one more set of practical methods which free market court services would develop in various manners to suit their clients. If the prosecutors (victim and arresting/jailing service) were responsible for the payment of all costs of the dispute to the accused, including restitution to him if he should be found innocent, then they will certainly want a "speedy" trial. Thus, if the whole system of justice were founded correctly, there would be no need for such ad hoc rules. Clearly, this is not something which needs to be enshrined in a statement of rights.

12) With respect to the requirement for a "public" trial, since there is no one with "interests" in a trial (no one else whose rights-relationship has been violated by the events in question) except the violated or the violators (both yet to be proven) or their agents, there is no clearly essential need for a trial to be open to anyone except those parties. However, such openness to third parties would probably be welcomed by both disputants to help them be sure of a fair trial. In addition, such openness of all trials would be so beneficial to the flow of information about integrity of others in society, that it might be made either an article of the contract between the various agencies and their clients stipulated by the agencies in order to demonstrate their fairness and discourage other potential offenders, or even an article of the social contract to which the disputants had previously agreed (see the Natural Social Contract).

13) The idea of a fully "impartial jury" from "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," is an inherently self-contradictory "ideal" which has led to numerous abuses in modern legal procedures. What kind of mechanism (jury, judge or something completely new) would be actually developed by a free market system of competing court service organizations, cannot be known with any certainty until such a system is allowed to occur, but making an authoritarian monopoly decision, a priori, and casting it in stone as a "Bill of Rights" is certainly not conducive to the production of court services which satisfy the best interests of all. Furthermore, the idea that humans cannot generally be persuaded by reason and logic to alter any preconceived notions and to see the truth and act on it, is contrary to the very possibility of a responsible mutually cooperative rational society. If this is not true in general then true freedom is forever impossible for mankind.

14) With a free market in protection, apprehension and court services, the phrase "which district shall have been previously ascertained by law" will be implemented by the need for each individual to be sure that he has a common contract basis with a person before initiating a relationship with him which proceeds beyond simple initial voluntary contact without exchange of significant value. By "a common contract basis", it is meant that their agencies of protection, apprehension and adjudication are either identical or have arrangements with each other to deal with situations in which their clients interact. If a person does not have such an agency with known procedures operating on his behalf, then he will need to have his own complete contract of understandings for everyone with whom he deals. Once he gets a reputation for being a person of high integrity, then this may well work. However, if he is unknown to those with whom he wishes to deal, then it will likely be in his best interest to contract with known services agencies so that they will more easily consider and proceed to deal with him. The protection, apprehension and court agencies with which he contracts would, in effect, "guarantee" his good behavior, thus conferring upon him a default level of integrity status with the people with whom he wishes to form relationships.

15) The requirements "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;" and "to be confronted with the witnesses against him", would likely be part of the standard operating procedures of court agencies with which any reasonable person would wish to deal. Thus, it is quite incorrect to view this as any kind of fundamental right, just it is with most other "entitlements" which are incorrectly termed "rights" within this "Bill of Rights". By posing the questions: "who is to provide this 'right'?" and "Does not the compelling of such people to provide these 'rights' constitute a violation of their right to life, liberty and property?", it is clear, instead, that these so-called "rights" must actually lead to violations of the valid rights of some other individual: the rights to his own life, liberty and property.

16) The requirement "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor", is such a clear violation of the right of liberty of the witnesses that it is truly shocking to see it included in a document related to rights. How can this loss of liberty by people who are innocent of any wrongdoing, but merely have knowledge of the violation, be justified? All that this clause does is create even more victims. The testimony of all witnesses should be entirely voluntary, and they should be paid for their services if they so require. The cost of witnesses should be part of the restitution obtained from the violator, since it is his own lack of confession when guilty (and thus being responsible for his transgression) which has necessitated the requirement for witnesses.

17) Finally, the requirement "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" again begs the questions "Who is to provide this? Who is to pay for it? And are not their rights violated by these actions?" Clearly, this is simply one more "privilege" guaranteed to the accused violator rather than any valid "right". In addition, if the trial were a dispute between defendant and plaintiff (potential violator and victim) as all valid trials should be, then each party has the equal right to help from anyone who he can hire.

Amendment VII

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

18) "twenty dollars" is such an arbitrary figure and open to change as time passes, that it is ludicrous to find such a statement enshrined within the "Bill of Rights". As described above, the mechanisms of trial ("trial by jury", "rules of common law", etc.) would depend on the details of operation of the court agency(s) conducting the trial(s), which in turn would be a result of market demand by their clients. Likely these procedures would strongly embody those which have been found historically to be useful for determining justice (generally, that is what "common law" is - the principles of law which have "proven" themselves to be useful and acceptable), but these are not something which can or should be dictated by an authoritarian state with the effect of preventing any freely chosen alternatives from being developed and used.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

19) This is another very arbitrary statement not about ethics, but merely about matters relating to court procedure, restitution and punishment. Because of its arbitrariness and its use of judgmental terms ("excessive", "cruel and unusual") for which no definition is given, this statement has been the cause of enormous legal battles, injustices and costs of time and resources to all parties in the cases involved.

20) The purpose of bail is to prevent the accused from escaping from the trial before his guilt or innocence is determined, thereby preventing any award of restitution from being paid to the victim by the violator. The amount of bail required should be whatever the accuser and the protection/apprehension service decides to be necessary to prevent this occurrence up to and including the amount of restitution for which the victim is asking. However, this decision will be moderated by the fact that the restriction of the liberty of the accused, because of not being granted sufficiently low bail that he can be free, may also be one of his claims for restitution should he be found innocent. In addition, if the costs that the plaintiff incurs in order to get a restitution award are too large, then the violator may never be able to pay the entire amount ("you can't get blood from a stone") even if he might have been able to pay the original restitution itself. Clearly, time and experience related to the certainty, the severity, the potential restitution award, and the ability of the violator to pay it, should determine how high bail is set. In such an environment of full responsibility of everyone for his decisions, no concept such as "excessive" is correctly applicable to bail (or even fines and punishments as will be argued next).

21) The word "fine" is inappropriate for any restitution awarded by a free market court, since there is no state involved to impose a "fine" for the purpose of punishment of the offender. Under a truly just system, all awards would be restitution paid by the proven violator to the victim, who then would pay all the costs of the apprehension, arrest, confinement and trial. Separate from the victim's requirement to pay all these costs (which he has voluntarily chosen to incur) to the individuals and agencies which provided the services necessary to establish his right of restitution from his violator, is his right to extract restitution from the violator additional to these costs which as near as possible places him into the same state of value, that he would have been in at the time of its ultimate payment to him, had the violation not occurred. The amount and type of this restitution is a matter for the victim to argue before the court and for the court to decide. Once suitable restitution is awarded, the victim may or may not employ a restitution service to use whatever method it deems best to obtain the restitution from the violator. For property assets which can be returned or for which a replacement can be purchased which is satisfactory to the victim, the principle here is very clear. Payment of all costs plus return or replacement of the property plus adequate recompense for the loss due to not having use of the stolen property during the period between its theft and its restoration should suffice. For physical harm, pain and suffering, it would seem that the amount of restitution (perhaps up to and including the infliction of the same harm in degree and kind) must be entirely up to the victim because only he can know what harm, pain and suffering were inflicted upon him. However, it should be noted that even here there is a natural check against "excessive" punishment because the victim must first pay off the costs of the whole process and will generally require the violator's productive abilities to do that. In the end, if the only thing that will satisfy the just restitution of the victim is that the violator should suffer the same kind of harm (as with "an eye for an eye"), then that is how it may need to be in order to secure true justice for the victim (which is the paramount principle involved), either after the violator has paid all the necessary costs to the victim, or even before, if the victim is able and prepared to pay them himself. The limits on what kinds of restitution are allowed by his court agency will likely be an important consideration when deciding whether to deal with someone or not.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

22) There would be no need to enumerate rights if the sole basis of rights was correctly understood and stated to be the right not to have physical force or fraud threatened or initiated against the life, liberty or property of the individual or those whom he values. Here at least, it is clear that "the people" simply means each and every one of the individuals in the country.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

23) Again there would be no need to say any such thing if it were correctly understood that all power over his own life, liberty and property is inherent in the individual. Any other group or individual has only as much power over his life, liberty and property as the individual grants and only for as long as he grants it to them. The only exception is when a person becomes a violator, for then he has stepped outside the bounds of "acceptable" human behavior and may have force used upon him by the individual he has violated or his agent(s) as has been described previously and is detailed within the Natural Social Contract).