The following email (and incorporated attachment) is a continuation of the written critical exchange arranged with libertarian writer George H. Smith in the summer of 2003 as a paid critique service for the purpose of obtaining some logical analysis of the philosophical basis of the Self-Sovereign Individual Project by a knowledgeable libertarian thinker. (See Link Note)
Paul's inline comments follow George's intact email and incorporated WORD attachment critique of the early September 2003 version of the Declaration of Individual Independence, annotated version. Current DOII_annotated.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Part Three
Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2003 14:26:38 -0500
From: George H. Smith
To: Paul Antonik Wakfer
Paul,
I wasn't in the best frame of mind after our recent
exchanges, so I decided it would be best to let a little
time pass before continuing with this project, so as not
to let my feelings interfere with my judgments.
Enclosed is Part Three. The rest will follow within the
next day or so.
George
Start time: 12.41 pm.
6) This document is first and foremost a declaration of independence and self-sovereignty by an "individual" human, not by any group of them, political or otherwise. This is because groups of humans do not exist as thinking, acting entities with any characteristics of decision making or acting similar to those of individual humans. This difference is not trivial, nor merely syntactical, stylistic or superficial; it is a basic fact of reality. Ignoring the foundational character of this fact of reality is the fundamental flaw lurking within the writings and conclusions of most thinkers on the subject of human social relationships. Just as this use of plurals, either nouns or pronouns, to represent entities which are then depicted within sentences as thinking, deciding, acting, etc. - ie. doing all manner of mental activities which only individual humans can do - is fundamental to the very structure of most world languages, so also and to that extent are herd, tribal, clan and collectivist notions fundamental to the very core thinking of most humans. It is this which I seek to expose, so that it can be eradicated from human thought and so that the reality of true individualism can finally shine through the veil of collectivism which currently shrouds much human thought.
I agree of course with your statement of methodological individualism (as the position you defend is usually called). But I think it is a mistake to link this to the use of plural pronouns and nouns, which is a matter of linguistic convention and doesn't normally carry the philosophical implications that you attribute to it. Jefferson, for example, was a thorough-going methodological individualist (as were all Lockeans), despite his use of plural pronouns in the Declaration. I discussed this previously.
7) Such a Declaration can only take place at a time when a human has reached sufficient intellectual understanding and maturity to know that the full flowering of his life's potential requires no more and no less than a very minimal, but nevertheless special kind of ordering of society. Whether sufficient numbers of people have reached this stage to achieve the society that I envision, is not at all certain. However, it is my hope that with the use of the Internet to aid the promotion of these ideas and aid the implementation of what I propose, that a society of optimal interpersonal freedom can finally come to pass.
It think it is a mistake to link the acceptance of your views to the intellectual "maturity" of those who disagree with you. This sounds too condescending.
8) I have above summarized the hallmarks of this intellectual understanding and maturity, and have in the Natural Social Contract [in progress] used the term "Adult" to describe a person who has attained this level. (In this context, "Adult" does not relate to age, but only to level of intellectual attainment.) From a social responsibility perspective, adult status may be seen as having been reached by and appropriate to a human who understands that portion of his own "nature" which necessitates a certain kind of behavior towards and from others in order to allow the fullest development of his own happiness.
The problem of the "age of consent" has always been a troublesome one in libertarian theory. Nevertheless, I find some of your remarks (e.g., "from a social responsibility perspective") needlessly vague. You might wish to look at Spencer's treatment in Social Statics (chapter titled "The Rights of Children"). I also have a lengthy discussion of "Children's Rights in Political Philosophy" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. This summary of different theories of children's rights, including those in the libertarian tradition, might give you some ideas.
9) The phrase, "promotion of his happiness", is critical to understanding this Declaration and the world-view upon which it is based (as will be seen below) since, even though determining how to best promote one's own happiness is fraught with great difficulty, one thing is certain - that only the individual himself has any significant chance to determine.
This is similar to the utilitarian maxim that each individual is the best judge of his or her own interests. Jeremy Bentham presents an interesting defense of this thesis in The Principles of Morals and Legislation.
However, even an individual needs to be very clear about what exactly he is trying to increase or augment when he aims to promote his happiness. I distinguish happiness from pleasure, gratification, satisfaction, contentment and fulfillment, although these are all preliminary to, contributory to and part of happiness.
I agree that happiness is more than the sum of pleasures (the view of classical hedonism), but I find it hard to imagine how it could be anything other than a type of "contentment or fulfillment."
In what follows, happiness means the integrated evaluation of all these multiple components and more - that which a rational, volitional, self-aware and self-directed lifeform seeks.
I don't know what it means to speak of happiness as a type of "evaluation," whether integrated or not. Evaluation is an intellectual process -- a judgment of better or worse -- whereas happiness is a psychological state. It might be true that happiness results from integrated evaluations of the components you mention, but this doesn't mean that happiness is the same thing as those evaluations.
The major difference between self-aware and non self-aware lifeforms may be that a non self-aware lifeform "seeks" only to maximize its instantaneous pleasure or gratification, while a self-aware rational lifeform consciously seeks to maximize its integrated lifetime happiness. It should be noted in passing that humans are not the only lifeforms on earth which operate to maximize their long range self-interest.
Since the pursuit of "long range self-interest" requires the conceptual ability to think beyond the range of the moment, your latter statement implicitly attributes the ability to reason to animals other than man. I don't see any convincing evidence for this, but that's really not the issue here. The problem you will inevitably encounter is whether these other rational beings possess rights similar to those of humans -- and, if they do, whether they should be included in your social contract.
Even though "flowering of his human potential" is not a primary goal, I have included it right after "promotion of his happiness" because it is so preliminary to and necessary for the happiness of any person as a human individual as to be practically essential (particularly the potential for rational thought and action).
This is generally referred in ethical theory as "self-realization" or "self-fulfillment." It is quite similar to Aristotle's theory that happiness (eudaemonia) is a type of successful activity, one that actualizes various human potentials, especially those pertaining to reason, man's essential characteristic.
In addition, there are many, many humans who could, in fact, never be completely happy without realizing some particular potential. For them, "flowering of his human potential" (even if not an essentially "human" potential - see next paragraph) is, in fact, one of the dimensions of their happiness. In addition, "happiness" seems to be an amount of something which is unbounded (certainly in time) and not something which can be "achieved", whereas "potential" appears not to be an amount of something, but instead a level or goal which, although it may be altered by self-knowledge, is capable of attainment at some point in a lifetime.
I find this confusing. I think you should rewrite it. Moreover, generally speaking, I think it might be better to use a word like "fulfillment" "or realization" instead of "flowering," which is a bit too metaphorical for my tastes.
It is the maximizing of such happiness summed up over a lifetime which is the essentially human goal that each individual seeks, and this statement is one of the "self-evident truths" (empirically derived axioms of reality) which I formally state in item III of the Declaration.10)
I don't think happiness can be "summed up," since this implies cardinal (rather than ordinal) measurement. In other words, there does not exist an invariable unit of happiness that can be added up or subtracted. Happiness is a matter of more or less.
Nor do I think that the pursuit of happiness is "self-evident." We can view it as such only if we empty the word "happiness" of any substantive content. There is of course a sense in which every person, in every action he takes, may be said to be pursuing happiness, since all purposeful actions are motivated by the desire to replace a less satisfactory condition (subjectively considered) with one that is more satisfactory. Only in this sense (which is called psychological eudaemonism) can we say that the pursuit of happiness is anything like "self-evident."
But this doesn't get us very far, since, according to this theory, the mass murderer is pursuing happiness as much as anyone else. You are advocating a specific theory of happiness, an objective theory based on the rational fulfillment of human potential -- and there is nothing "self-evident" about this theory. This is partially because you are proposing a normative rather than a descriptive theory. You are stating what people should do to attain happiness, not merely describing what they do in fact.
One test of a self-evident truth is that its denial involves a logical contradiction. And it is quite possible for critics to disagree with your theory of happiness without involving themselves in a logical contradiction.
The phrase, "his human potential", is also critical here because the juxtaposition of "human" with "potential" refers to the common attributes which all humans have as members of the species homo sapiens which differentiate them from other lifeforms - most particularly to the characteristics of mind which are the defining human characteristics. Humans have limited "freedom" just as does everything else in nature. They can only exist and act according to what they are in reality. They are not free to fly (unaided), time travel, to walk through walls, or to read the minds of other humans.
Your examples are limitations on human powers and abilities, not restrictions on our "freedom." Freedom (except when used in reference to "free will") is an interpersonal concept, one that pertains to the absence of coercion in social relationships. I do not have the physical ability to jump over the moon, but I am "free" to try, if no other person forcibly prevents me from doing so.
Just as any lifeform in reality must act according to its nature (or take some usually negative consequences), so humans too are only free to do what is in their nature according to the laws of reality without bearing costs.
All choices involve costs in the form of forgone opportunities. Moreover, strictly speaking, it is impossible for any entity, including humans, to act in contravention to its nature -- for the "nature" of something is simply the totality of its characteristics, and its capacities (what it can do) are determined by its characteristics.
For example, just as a wooden beam under too much of a load will break, so a human's health will suffer if he does not eat adequate food in type and amount, and so also will his potential for happiness suffer if he does not associate at all with other humans or if he does not conduct his interactions with them in a manner which fits the common nature that they all share as human beings.
Even if a person eats nutritional food, this is not without cost. This includes the cost of the forgone pleasure of eating foods that are less nutritional but perhaps better tasting (in the estimation of the eater).
This is not to say that I disagree with your basic point. I don't. I am simply pointing out that there is far more involved here than you indicate.
As for the claim that an individual's potential for happiness [will] suffer if he does not associate at all with other humans or if he does not conduct his interactions with them in a manner which fits the common nature that they all share as human beings -- this is highly questionable. I see no evidence, for example, that dictators are necessarily unhappy, or that they would have been happier had they respected the equal rights of others.
I think the argument needs to be made that it is wrong to violate the equal freedom of others, even if such violation might make the violator a happier person.
[More will follow shortly, perhaps later today.]
Ghs
Stop time: 1.58 pm.
Time expended: 1 hr., 17 min.
Total time remaining: 1 hr., 43 min
[Although Paul never sent the response comments below to George Smith (since George never replied to the others, what was the point?), as with the previous responses, George's original is indented in dark blue while Paul's comments are in black.]
6) This document is first and foremost a declaration of independence and self-sovereignty by an "individual" human, not by any group of them, political or otherwise. This is because groups of humans do not exist as thinking, acting entities with any characteristics of decision making or acting similar to those of individual humans. This difference is not trivial, nor merely syntactical, stylistic or superficial; it is a basic fact of reality. Ignoring the foundational character of this fact of reality is the fundamental flaw lurking within the writings and conclusions of most thinkers on the subject of human social relationships. Just as this use of plurals, either nouns or pronouns, to represent entities which are then depicted within sentences as thinking, deciding, acting, etc. - ie. doing all manner of mental activities which only individual humans can do - is fundamental to the very structure of most world languages, so also and to that extent are herd, tribal, clan and collectivist notions fundamental to the very core thinking of most humans. It is this which I seek to expose, so that it can be eradicated from human thought and so that the reality of true individualism can finally shine through the veil of collectivism which currently shrouds much human thought.
I agree of course with your statement of methodological individualism (as the position you defend is usually called). But I think it is a mistake to link this to the use of plural pronouns and nouns, which is a matter of linguistic convention and doesn't normally carry the philosophical implications that you attribute to it. Jefferson, for example, was a thorough-going methodological individualist (as were all Lockeans), despite his use of plural pronouns in the Declaration. I discussed this previously.
My point is more implicit that explicit. I maintain that anyone who continues to use such "linguistic conventions" is not going to be able to prevent such use from influencing his/her thinking. This use of collective phrasings is so ingrained in the language that unless one understands that, and continuously consciously guards against its influence, one will not be able to truly be a methodological individualist. Furthermore, the stylistic use is even worse because without intending or even knowing it, one is essentially guilty of using misleading, fraudulent persuasive methods. For a few examples see my essay: The Essential Collectivism of Language and Thought.
7) Such a Declaration can only take place at a time when a human has reached sufficient intellectual understanding and maturity to know that the full flowering of his life's potential requires no more and no less than a very minimal, but nevertheless special kind of ordering of society. Whether sufficient numbers of people have reached this stage to achieve the society that I envision, is not at all certain. However, it is my hope that with the use of the Internet to aid the promotion of these ideas and aid the implementation of what I propose, a society of optimal interpersonal freedom can finally come to pass.
It think it is a mistake to link the acceptance of your views to the intellectual "maturity" of those who disagree with you. This sounds too condescending.
If the truth is "condescending", so be it. The facts of reality are that most people in current society are not mature enough in their thinking about the effects of their actions and their responsibilities for those effects to be ready to execute a declaration of self-sovereignty or a social contract. If this were so, then society would not be in the dire state that it is. When they are mature enough, they will want to sign it, and if they sign it, then this will most likely show that they are mature enough.
8) I have above summarized the hallmarks of this intellectual understanding and maturity, and have in the Natural Social Contract [in progress] used the term "Adult" to describe a person who has attained this level. (In this context, "Adult" does not relate to age, but only to level of intellectual attainment.) From a social responsibility perspective, adult status may be seen as having been reached by and appropriate to a human who understands that portion of his own "nature" which necessitates a certain kind of behavior towards and from others in order to allow the fullest development of his own happiness.
The problem of the "age of consent" has always been a troublesome one in libertarian theory.
This is but one instance of the inconsistency and incompleteness of "libertarian theory". The correct solution would not contain an "age of consent" at all, since it is obvious that no such sharp demarcation line occurs in reality.
Nevertheless, I find some of your remarks (e.g., "from a social responsibility perspective") needlessly vague.
The idea is more fully detailed in the Natural Social Contract. At this point it was not a "remark" but merely a prefatory clause.
You might wish to look at Spencer's treatment in Social Statics (chapter titled "The Rights of Children"). I also have a lengthy discussion of "Children's Rights in Political Philosophy" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. This summary of different theories of children's rights, including those in the libertarian tradition, might give you some ideas.
I have read enough of these in the past to know that they are rife with equivocations, compromises and inconsistencies. This is because their basis is wrong. Besides, I have chosen not to deal directly with the issues of children's rights at the start. It is first necessary to work out how clearly adult humans should and can deal with one another to achieve their mutually optimal benefit. As for the definition of "Adult", I think that I have given a fully adequate definition within my Natural Social Contract.
9) The phrase, "promotion of his happiness", is critical to understanding this Declaration and the world-view upon which it is based (as will be seen below) since, even though determining how to best promote one's own happiness is fraught with great difficulty, one thing is certain - that only the individual himself has any significant chance to determine it.
This is similar to the utilitarian maxim that each individual is the best judge of his or her own interests. Jeremy Bentham presents an interesting defense of this thesis in The Principles of Morals and Legislation.[link added]
I don't think so. I certainly could not find anything fully equivalent to my definition of happiness and the individuality of its valuation in that book. Moreover, this thesis needs no "defense". It is clear from the scientific knowledge of neurology and psychology as well as from introspection.
However, even an individual needs to be very clear about what exactly he is trying to increase or augment when he aims to promote his happiness. I distinguish happiness from pleasure, gratification, satisfaction, contentment and fulfillment, although these are all preliminary to, contributory to and part of happiness.
I agree that happiness is more than the sum of pleasures (the view of classical hedonism), but I find it hard to imagine how it could be anything other than a type of "contentment or fulfillment."
No! Contentment and fulfillment are very passive kinds of happiness. They have little relationship to joy, thrills, exhilaration, etc, which are all important kinds or "dimensions" of happiness.
In what follows, happiness means the integrated evaluation of all these multiple components and more - that which a rational, volitional, self-aware and self-directed lifeform seeks.
I don't know what it means to speak of happiness as a type of "evaluation," whether integrated or not. Evaluation is an intellectual process -- a judgment of better or worse -- whereas happiness is a psychological state.
Yes, it is a psychological state (actually it is many such states - one for each type of happiness), but how do you think that such psychological states are reached? They do not simply come out of nowhere by whim. Every brain state is the result of some kind of "computation" being done by the physiological components of the brain to arrive at that particular state. Furthermore, when an individual makes a decision which is based on his overall happiness expectation, he must also actually sum up these various types of happiness states, weigh them against one another and reach a final result. Again, such a decision is not done by mere whim. Somewhere in his brain is a processor which is feeding the result into his consciousness to allow him to make the final decision - the "judgment of better or worse". In the end, all emotion is intimately connected with all evaluation and judgment. That is why it is so important to have one's emotions consistent with one's consciously held values.
It might be true that happiness results from integrated evaluations of the components you mention, but this doesn't mean that happiness is the same thing as those evaluations.
Since it is the integrated evaluations done by background processors in the brain which causes the given psychological states of the many kinds of happiness, in essence they are one and the same.
The major difference between self-aware and non self-aware lifeforms may be that a non self-aware lifeform "seeks" only to maximize its instantaneous pleasure or gratification, while a self-aware rational lifeform consciously seeks to maximize its integrated lifetime happiness. It should be noted in passing that humans are not the only lifeforms on earth which operate to maximize their long range self-interest.
Since the pursuit of "long range self-interest" requires the conceptual ability to think beyond the range of the moment, your latter statement implicitly attributes the ability to reason to animals other than man. I don't see any convincing evidence for this, but that's really not the issue here.
There are other ways of thinking and planning, and more generally, of brain/mind functioning, than conscious language-based reasoning. Besides, if you think about the fact of evolution and if you imagine that all stages of the development of man from lower animals are still here on Earth (as they could conceivably be) then where exactly does human reasoning begin and animal non-reasoning end? Clearly, there is a continuum of different levels and types of thinking or brain/mind activity between even current animals and man. There is no black and white difference as many philosophers have maintained. If you have ever lived with a dog, cat or other fairly intelligent animal, you would have seen examples of behaviors which are so similar to humans that it is clearly a kind of thought which is taking place, albeit without language. And this is not mere anthropomorphism - it makes good sense based on the knowledge of evolution.
The problem you will inevitably encounter is whether these other rational beings possess rights similar to those of humans -- and, if they do, whether they should be included in your social contract.
Very good insight! Yes, this approach is exactly the basis for understanding how to set up human/animal relationships which are also best for all concerned. However, this is another reason why a "rights" approach does not work. And no, animals do not need to be, and cannot be included in the Natural Social Contract mainly because they cannot understand it and volitionally agree to and execute it.
Even though "flowering of his human potential" is not a primary goal, I have included it right after "promotion of his happiness" because it is so preliminary to and necessary for the happiness of any person as a human individual as to be practically essential (particularly the potential for rational thought and action).
This is generally referred in ethical theory as "self-realization" or "self-fulfillment." It is quite similar to Aristotle's theory that happiness (eudaemonia) is a type of successful activity, one that actualizes various human potentials, especially those pertaining to reason, man's essential characteristic.
This does not seem to be the common definition of "eudaemonia". The Britannica Concise Encyclopedia states that it means: In ethics, the view that the ultimate justification of virtuous activity is happiness. But yes, I do view self-realization as merely one kind of happiness. Although, as I stated, the self-realization of rational thought is so important that it is practically essential for optimizing one's ability to gain happiness.
In addition, there are many, many humans who could, in fact, never be completely happy without realizing some particular potential. For them, "flowering of his human potential" (even if not an essentially "human" potential - see next paragraph) is, in fact, one of the dimensions of their happiness. In addition, "happiness" seems to be an amount of something which is unbounded (certainly in time) and not something which can be "achieved", whereas "potential" appears not to be an amount of something, but instead a level or goal which, although it may be altered by self-knowledge, is capable of attainment at some point in a lifetime.
I find this confusing. I think you should rewrite it.
I am not sure exactly what is confusing about it. In the first two sentences, I refer to many human potential realizations which relate more to purely animal activities and only indirectly to reason (eg. many sports activities). In the last sentence, I am contrasting "realization of potential" with "gaining happiness". "Potential" appears to have the meaning of a static level which can actually be reached, whereas "total happiness" is never attainable since you can always get more of it over time. Perhaps I need to expand it for it to be clearer. In any case, the meaning and definition of happiness is more fully detailed in the annotated Natural Social Contract.
Moreover, generally speaking, I think it might be better to use a word like "fulfillment" "or realization" instead of "flowering," which is a bit too metaphorical for my tastes.
You are right. I have now replaced "flowering" with "realization".
It is the maximizing of such happiness summed up over a lifetime which is the essentially human goal that each individual seeks, and this statement is one of the "self-evident truths" (empirically derived axioms of reality) which I formally state in item III of the Declaration.10)
I don't think happiness can be "summed up," since this implies cardinal (rather than ordinal) measurement.
This difference between cardinal and ordinal, that philosophers often make, is purely related to the usage of these words within language. Science has shown that for anything to be meaningful in reality it must be able to be measured. Furthermore, nothing physical can be measured exactly (things can be counted exactly - but that is an activity of logic rather than physics). All measurements end up with comparisons of more or less. They do so by essentially using a very fine grid or cell size in which to place the result of the measurement. Thus, within the realm of states of reality, all of which are ultimately measurable, everything is both cardinal and ordinal, and is capable of approximate computation (and just as all measurement is approximate, so are the results of all computations with those measurements).
In other words, there does not exist an invariable unit of happiness that can be added up or subtracted. Happiness is a matter of more or less.
That is simply because neuroscience does not yet have the knowledge or ability to measure most of its types (although pain can be seen in the brain experimentally). Each type of happiness state must in fact be a measurable amount of one or more biological parameters within the brain in order to exist at all. That means that neuroscience can not only measure them in theory, and eventually in practice after science gets to that level, but that they must also be able to undergo computation. Somewhere in the brain, that is actually being done in some yet to be understood manner. Again, this is more fully explained in the Natural Social Contract. For some of the related science, see
Pleasure: the common currency
Principles of pleasure prediction: specifying the neural dynamics of human reward learning
Brain activation during facial emotion processing
Morals and the human brain: a working model.
Neuroimaging of emotion and personality: scientific evidence and ethical considerations
Emotion and its disorders
Attentional control of the processing of neural and emotional stimuli
However, if you only mean that there is no unit of happiness which allows the happiness of one person to be compared with that of another, then I would agree with you. And since individual evaluation is completely personal, this will always be true even when the measurement of such states within a given brain is fully possible. However, this essential separation between individuals has no relationship to whether happiness is ordinal or cardinal, since even now it is impossible to compare one person's subjective happiness with that of another. Although I expect that scientists of the future will try to do so, I would strongly resist any attempt to try to objectify happiness comparisons between individuals.
Nor do I think that the pursuit of happiness is "self-evident." We can view it as such only if we empty the word "happiness" of any substantive content.
This seems to be a very inconsistent statement coming from one who is such an admirer of the US Declaration of Independence! However apart from that, I think that your statement shows that you do not understand that my term "happiness" is meant to include all those things which one desires and wants - which in the end bring one any form of pleasure. In this sense, "happiness" is (almost by definition) what any human seeks to gain. Whether his actions actually do gain it for himself in any optimal manner is the only question.
There is of course a sense in which every person, in every action he takes, may be said to be pursuing happiness, since all purposeful actions are motivated by the desire to replace a less satisfactory condition (subjectively considered) with one that is more satisfactory. Only in this sense (which is called psychological eudaemonism) can we say that the pursuit of happiness is anything like "self-evident."
As I have now indicated above (and also clearly do in the annotated Natural Social Contract) that is how I mean happiness. However, my idea is still different than psychological eudaemonism. I maintain that maximum lifetime happiness is and should be the purpose of every human action, not that every human action will ensure maximum lifetime happiness, nor even more current happiness as its immediate result. It is the fact that the purpose of every human action should be to give him maximum lifetime happiness which I regard as "self-evident" (once he has realized it, of course).
But this doesn't get us very far, since, according to this theory, the mass murderer is pursuing happiness as much as anyone else. You are advocating a specific theory of happiness, an objective theory based on the rational fulfillment of human potential -- and there is nothing "self-evident" about this theory. This is partially because you are proposing a normative rather than a descriptive theory. You are stating what people should do to attain happiness, not merely describing what they do in fact.
First, the mass murderer is pursuing the kind of happiness that I am talking about. He simply is not being very effective in his pursuit of it. Second, yes I am stating to a limited extent what people ought to do to attain happiness. However, I am not advocating "an objective theory based on the rational fulfillment of human potential", nor are my prescriptions "proposals" which are normative in the sense of being unfounded standards. Instead, the methods which I propose are "derived" from the nature of human beings in reality. It is in that sense that I maintain that the pursuit of happiness is self-evident (ie. axiomatic). So yes, I am not describing what humans do in fact, I am describing what they ought to do in order to achieve the goal of happiness which their factual actions show that they really want. If someone is such a sociopath (as a mass murderer) that he can only attain happiness by harming others, then such a person is not "human" by my definition and should be eliminated.
One test of a self-evident truth is that its denial involves a logical contradiction. And it is quite possible for critics to disagree with your theory of happiness without involving themselves in a logical contradiction.
Not at all. The opposite to my "theory of happiness" would be to pursue pain. This would ultimately end one's life and thus is contradictory to any life, not only that of a human.
The phrase, "his human potential", is also critical here because the juxtaposition of "human" with "potential" refers to the common attributes which all humans have as members of the species homo sapiens which differentiate them from other lifeforms - most particularly to the characteristics of mind which are the defining human characteristics. Humans have limited "freedom" [possible choices - see definition in the annotated Natural Social Contract] just as does everything else in nature. They can only exist and act according to what they are in reality. They are not free to fly (unaided), time travel, to walk through walls, or to read the minds of other humans.
Your examples are limitations on human powers and abilities, not restrictions on our "freedom." Freedom (except when used in reference to "free will") is an interpersonal concept, one that pertains to the absence of coercion in social relationships. I do not have the physical ability to jump over the moon, but I am "free" to try, if no other person forcibly prevents me from doing so.
If you read the annotated Natural Social Contract you will see that I fully distinguish between "freedom" - as possible available choices, and "liberty" - those freedoms which could be but are not constrained by other humans. This distinction is important because for maximizing one's happiness one needs not only full liberty, but beyond that, the greater freedom (possible choices) which a free society of creative entrepreneurs can bring about.
Just as any lifeform in reality must act according to its nature (or take some usually negative consequences), so humans too are only free to do what is in their nature according to the laws of reality without bearing costs.
All choices involve costs in the form of forgone opportunities. Moreover, strictly speaking, it is impossible for any entity, including humans, to act in contravention to its nature -- for the "nature" of something is simply the totality of its characteristics, and its capacities (what it can do) are determined by its characteristics.
The forgone opportunities of the choices not taken are logical consequences which are essentially inescapable. Therefore, I do not think it is fruitful to call them "costs" of an action (for the exact same reason that one cannot have one's cake and eat it too). Instead, the true "costs" of an action are its negative effects on specific aspects of happiness, even though the sum of all its effects may be positive. If the costs (negative effects) are for unseen reasons, too large, then the overall sum may be negative for happiness instead of positive. That is what I was meaning in the above which should have been clear from my examples that followed.
As for being impossible for a human to act in contravention to his nature, this is quite false. When a human does not think; when he does anything which he knows will damage his health; when he commits suicide; in all these cases a human is acting against his nature - meaning nature as a human, not merely as an individual.
For example, just as a wooden beam under too much of a load will break, so a human's health will suffer if he does not eat adequate food in type and amount, and so also will his potential for happiness suffer if he does not associate at all with other humans or if he does not conduct his interactions with them in a manner which fits the common nature that they all share as human beings.
Even if a person eats nutritional food, this is not without cost. This includes the cost of the forgone pleasure of eating foods that are less nutritional but perhaps better tasting (in the estimation of the eater).
Again since the two alternatives cannot exist together, I think it is useless to regard the not taken choices as costs of the choice taken. They may be reductions of immediate happiness, but they are not properly "costs". Moreover, it is a myth that more nutritional food need be less tasty for some people. Tastes are almost totally mutable and changeable. Anyone who wishes to do so can learn to enjoy most types of foods which are best for his health. Yes, there is a very small pleasure cost while the taste habits are being changed over, but the long-run benefits far out-weigh that small cost. Furthermore, the more nutritious food is no more costly in money than is the junk food, and it need take little more time to obtain or prepare. The same is true of smoking, alcohol usage or any other lifestyles which are conducive to ill health and shortened lifespan.
This is not to say that I disagree with your basic point. I don't. I am simply pointing out that there is far more involved here than you indicate.
Then you will have to raise other examples to convince me.
As for the claim that an individual's potential for happiness [will] suffer if he does not associate at all with other humans or if he does not conduct his interactions with them in a manner which fits the common nature that they all share as human beings -- this is highly questionable. I see no evidence, for example, that dictators are necessarily unhappy, or that they would have been happier had they respected the equal rights of others.
Here you have a valid point. The answer is twofold. First, currently all those who violate others need to be either made to restitute their victims or terminated in short order so that they clearly do not derive maximal lifetime happiness from such actions. Second, the first will happen naturally when the human lifespan is much more extended than now. A dictator may be able to keep control and enjoy his power and wealth for a lifetime of 80 years, but can you imagine him being able to do so for a major part of his life when the normal human lifespan is 1000 years? This is one example of why an unbounded lifespan is inextricably connected to any full solution to the creation of a stable free human society.
I think the argument needs to be made that it is wrong to violate the equal freedom of others, even if such violation might make the violator a happier person.
No. I specifically reject that because there is no basis for such a "wrong" other than the principle of maximizing human lifetime happiness. Such axiomatic normative imperatives are what have failed to persuade so many intellectuals and are the reason why freedom philosophy does not rule society.
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