The following is a short exchange between Paul Antonik Wakfer and a fellow participant in a libertarian-oriented Yahoo group, conducted off-group, regarding the restitution concept in Paul's essay "Social Meta-Needs: A New Basis for Optimal Interaction".
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: social meta-needs
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2004 07:16:59 -0800
From: PF
To: Paul Antonik Wakfer
I read your essay this morning, quickly but enough to get the gist. I agree with your objection to "rights", and your focus on negotiated agreements to increase mutual benefit. There were two smaller parts that I disagree with. I would prefer not to have a detailed discussion about them, as my time is quite limited, but perhaps these observations will be helpful to you.
First was the idea of letting the victim evaluate the harm done. Despite your specifically mentioning the issue, I am still deeply skeptical that there is any way for these evaluations to be honest. I don't think humans are even capable of complete honesty about such issues - even if we consciously try, we are subconsciously biased towards ourselves. In the terms of game theory, I don't believe there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism for revealing true valuations of harm suffered.
Second was the idea of reversing violations by restoring the same amount of happiness. The problem with this is that it ignores the situations where there is only a chance of the violator getting caught. (Or realizing that he has committed a violation). If thieves get caught 1/2 the time, and they only have to make up the value of stolen goods when caught, burglary will be a very profitable business. For this reason, setting optimal punishment levels is non-trivial, and there are major disadvantages to exact restitution only. To understand this issue more deeply, see David Friedman's book _Law's Order_.
--
PF
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: social meta-needs
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2004 14:47:31 -0700
From: Paul Antonik Wakfer
Organization: MoreLife
To: PF
PF wrote:
> I read your essay this morning, quickly but enough to get the gist. I
> agree with your objection to "rights", and your focus on negotiated
> agreements to increase mutual benefit. There were two smaller parts
> that I disagree with. I would prefer not to have a detailed discussion
> about them, as my time is quite limited, but perhaps these observations
> will be helpful to you.
This really stifles any purpose of anything that you say or I return to you.
> First was the idea of letting the victim evaluate the harm done. Despite
> your specifically mentioning the issue, I am still deeply skeptical that
> there is any way for these evaluations to be honest. I don't think
> humans are even capable of complete honesty about such issues - even if
> we consciously try, we are subconsciously biased towards ourselves.
However, the fundamental fact remains that there is no other method that can correctly evaluate the harm as unique to the one harmed. Thus, this method simply cannot be dismissed and one has no choice but to look for a way to make it work. Please keep in mind that I have thought of this "difficulty" long and hard; I do not think that even this practical "difficulty" is grounds to automatically dismiss a principle such as victim evaluation of harm which simply has no *just* equal. An essay on this subject is one yet to be written, as I acknowledge that it will be a major obstacle to the acceptance of my system.
> In the terms of game theory, I don't believe there exists an
> incentive-compatible mechanism for revealing true valuations of harm
> suffered.
If you had read the Natural Social Contract then you would have seen that there are such feed-back incentives for making true evaluations of harm suffered, built into the structure of that contract and the society which it generates.
> Second was the idea of reversing violations by restoring the same amount
> of happiness. The problem with this is that it ignores the situations
> where there is only a chance of the violator getting caught. (Or
> realizing that he has committed a violation). If thieves get caught 1/2
> the time, and they only have to make up the value of stolen goods when
> caught, burglary will be a very profitable business.
PF, I am not so naive that I haven't thought of this also. Again, I have spent many years thinking about these ideas in general and the last year writing them in detail, virtually full-time. This objection of yours is also fully accounted for in the structure and details of the Natural Social Contract. When you read the system in its entirety, please do raise situations that you think may not be covered, or covered inadequately. This will provide me with the needed "exercise" to continue evaluation and hone where shown to be necessary - a necessary step before the draft stage can be completed.
> For this reason,
> setting optimal punishment levels is non-trivial, and there are major
> disadvantages to exact restitution only. To understand this issue more
> deeply, see David Friedman's book _Law's Order_.
I have known this problem very well for over 25 years. My system takes it fully into account; but one must read it to see that is so. The simple answer is that fully complete restitution is always far more than merely the cost of the initial damage or the destroyed object. There is also loss of happiness through loss of use, apprehension and trial costs, interest costs, etc, etc. Finally, if the harm was intentional, then the violator loses all status under the Social Contract. He is effectively an outcast from the society. I am currently writing a detailed critique of Friedman's MofF chapters 41-43. [link added later after it had been completed.]
--Paul
Wakfer
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